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The Warren
Court and Congresst
Since the appointment of Mr. Chief Justice Warren the
Supreme Court frequently has been rebuked for what has
been called overzealous judicial activism and lack of defer-
ence toward Congress. Professor Chase shows, however,
that such criticisms have been responses to a very limited
portion of the Court's decisions-those involving segrega-
tion or issues of national security. Moreover, from can-
vassing all the decisions of the Warren Court relating to,
congressional power, he feels that such attacks are unwar-
ranted. While defending the Court from these attacks, he
contends that the Court has in fact exercised an excess of
self-restraint and that its real shortcoming has been in its
failure to prevent Congress from invading individual rights
-a duty imposed on the Court by the Constitution.
Harold W. Chase*
Since its decisions in the segregation cases in 1954, the Warren
Court has frequently been accused of usurping congressional power.
Until 1958, it was easy for a close observer of the Court to dismiss
the charges as baseless, for it seemed apparent that a majority of
the Court was committed to a philosophy of judicial self-restraint
and, as a consequence of that philosophy, was on the whole deferen-
tial to Congress. Moreover, the charge of excessive judicial activism
initially came from individuals and groups which had a highly
partisan interest in specific problems decided by the Court. The crit-
ical responses of such people to the performance of the Court were
political and emotional, rather than analytical and objective. For ex-
ample, nineteen southern Senators and eighty-two southern Repre-
f This Article is a revised version of a paper delivered by the author at the annual
meeting of the American Political Science Association in Washington, D.C., Septem-
ber 11, 1959. See the Washington Post, Oct. 5, 1959, § A, p. 12, col. 1, for an editorial
comment on the paper.0 Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota. The author
wishes to acknowledge the valuable criticism of Professors John J. Cound and Yale
Kamisar of the University of Minnesota Law School and Professors William Anderson
and Lloyd Short of the Political Science Department of the University of Minnesota.
The author would like to make clear that this acknowledgment should not be taken
to mean that the aforementioned professors necessarily share his views, either as to
analysis of the cases or as to conclusions.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
sentatives joined in issuing a "manifesto" in March of 1956, which
read in part:
We regard the decision of the Supreme Court in the school cases as a
clear abuse of judicial power. It climaxes a trend in the federal judiciary
undertaking to legislate, in derogation of the authority of Congress, and to
encroach upon the reserved rights of the States and the people. ....
[T]he Supreme Court of the United States, with no legal basis for such
action, undertook to exercise their naked judicial power and substituted
their personal political and social ideas for the established law of the land.'
Of course it was clearly foreseeable that southern politicians, for
emotional or political reasons, would feel compelled to protest
against the decisions in the segregation cases and that "any stick
would do to beat the dog." It was quite disturbing, however, when
in 1958 the state chief justices and such eminent constitutional law
experts as Learned Hand and Professor Corwin also accused the
Warren Court of usurping congressional power, even though they
did not refer to the segregation cases.
In his widely-publicized Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures, the
venerable Judge Hand, a long-time advocate of judicial self-
restraint, restated his views concerning the proper role of the
Supreme Court in the American scheme of government.2 The lec-
tures were not, as sometimes advertised, an attack on the Warren
Court per se.3 Rather, as Judge Hand indicated, he was addressing
himself "to the function of United States courts, particularly the
Supreme Court, of declaring invalid statutes of Congress, or of the
States, or acts of the President, because they- are in conflict with
what we have come to call our 'Bill of Bights' . . . ." ' As his basic
assumption, Judge Hand stated:
The authority of courts to annul statutes (and a fortiori, acts of the Execu-
tive) may, and indeed must, be inferred, although it is nowhere ex-
1. Southern Congressmen Present Segregation Manifesto, 12 CoNG. Q. AI . 416-17
(1956).
2. HAND, TuE BILL oF EIGHrS (1958). For his earlier views see Hand, The Con-.
tribution of an Independent Judiciary to Civilization, reprinted in Tnm SPmrr op
LmxwrY 155 (Dillard ed. 1952); Hand, Chief Justice Stone's Conception of the
Judicial Function, 46 COLum. L. REv. 696 (1946). For an assessment of Hand's
earlier views, see Wyzanski, Judge Learned Hand's Contributions to Public Law, 60
H v. L. REv. 348, 353 (1947). For a view that Hand now favors more judicial
review than he did previously, see Rostow, The Supreme Court and the People's Will
33 NoTRE DA2m LAw. 573, 584 (1958).
3. For example, the New York Times captioned its report of Hand's second lecture
in this manner:
TOP COURT CHIDED
BY LEARNED HAND
He Says It Still Functions
Occasionally as a "T'hird
Legislative Chamber"
N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1958, p. 19, col. 1.
4. HAis, Tim BmL oF RIGHTs 1 (1958).
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pressed. . . .However, this power should be confined to occasions when
the statute or order was outside the grant of power to the grantee, and
should not include a review of how the power has been exercised.5
He endeavored to demonstrate that the Supreme Court as an insti-
tution has, from time to time, gone beyond what he considers to be
the Court's proper function. But the fact is inescapable that he felt
that the Warren Court was as guilty of exceeding its powers at the
expense of Congress as some of its predecessors. For example, in ref-
erence to the segregation decisions, he said:
I cannot frame any definition that will explain when the Court will assume
the role of a third legislative chamber and when it will limit its authority
to keeping Congress and the states within their accredited authority.
Nevertheless, I am quite clear that it has not abdicated its former function,
as to which I hope that it may be regarded as permissible for me to say
that I have never been able to understand on what basis it does or can
rest except as a coup de main.6
It was also clear that Judge Hand was referring to the Warren
Court when he said:
I trust it is not disrespectful to say that I find it impossible to prediet
what attitude the Court would take towards a statute of which it much
disapproved even where it concerned economic issues only; and as will
appear, the answer becomes decidedly more obscure when the statute
touches those other interests, now called 'Tersonal Rights." 7
Professor Corwins main criticism of the Warren Court came in
his response to a New York Times editorial which had urged the
defeat of legislative proposals aimed at curbing the Court. Pointing
to the decisions in Yates v. United Statess and Watkins v. United
States,9 Corwin charged that "keeping the court out of legislative
territory" had become a "real problem." 10 In his characteristically
colorful style, Professor Corwin said: "There can be no doubt that
on June 17 last [the day Watkins and Yates were decided] the court
went on a virtual binge and thrust its nose into matters beyond its
competence, with the result that (in my judgment at least) it should
have aforesaid nose well tweaked." 1
Late in 1958, the Conference of Chief Justices approved a report
of its Committee on Federal-State Relationships as Affected by Ju-
dicial Decisions, which was highly critical of the Warren Court.12
Although much of the report criticized supervision of state action
5. Id. at 66.
6. Id. at 55.
7. Id. at 46.
8. 854 U.S. 298 (1957).
9. 854 U.S. 178 (1957).
10. N.Y. Times, March 16, 1958, § 4, p. 10, col 6.
11. Ibid.
12. Co FEamNcE OF CmiEF Jusncxs, Co NunTI= ON FEDmaAL-STATE BEL&nON-
smPS As AFFEcTE BY JunIcIAL DECISIoNs, REPORT (1958).
19601
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:595
by the Supreme Court, it was clear that the state chief justices felt
that the Court had encroached on the power of Congress also. 3 It
is noteworthy that of the nine chief justices and one associate justice
who composed the committee which drafted the report, only two
came from states which have been intransigent on the problem of
integration.14 But the significance which might normally attach to
this fact palls when one considers the remarks of Chief Justice
Charles A. Jones of Pennsylvania, spoken in opposition to the report
at the Conference. In his opinion the segregation decisions really
underlay even the chief justices' chastisement of the Court.5 None-
theless, with such prestigious critics expressing concern that the
present Supreme Court has been encroaching upon the power of
Congress, a critical re-examination of the decisions of the Warren
Court which concern congressional power is certainly warranted.
Fortunately, there is consensus on the two most important criteria
for judging the Court's performance as it pertains to Congress. It is
generally agreed that (1) the Court should keep Congress within
constitutional bounds, but that (2) the Court should not arrogate
13.
Second only to the increasing dominance of the national government has been
the development of the immense power of the Supreme Court in both state and
national affairs. It is not merely the final arbiter of the law; it is the maker of
policy in many major social and economic fields. It is not subject to the re-
straints to which a legislative body is subject. There are points at which it is
difficult to delineate precisely the line which should circumscribe the judicial
function and separate it from that of policy-making. Thus, usually within narrow
limits, a court may be called upon in the ordinary course of its duties to make
what is actually a policy decision by choosing between two rules, either of
which might be deemed applicable to the situation presented in a pending case.
But if and when a court in construing and applying a constitutional provision
or a statute becomes a policy-maker, it may leave construction behind and
exercise functions which are essentially legislative in character, whether they
serve in practical effect as a constitutional amendment or as an amendment of
a statute. It is here that we feel the greatest concern, and it is here that we
think the greatest restraint is called for. There is nothing new in urging judicial
self-restraint, though there may be, and we think there is, new need to urge it.
CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JusTIcEs, CowmnI-r=E ON FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONSHIPS AS
AFFECTED BY JuDicaLm DEcIsIONs, REPoRT 7 (1958).
14. Id. at 31.
15.
It is true that nowhere in the report is the public school segregation decision
mentioned. According to reliable newspaper account of the introduction of the
resolution and the report whereon it is based, "it was explained that Committee
members felt that to inject this into the study would stir sectional feelings
and defeat the over-all purpose of the study." I readily and whole-heartedly
concede the good faith of the Committees desire and intent in such regard, but
the fact remains that no matter how meticulously reference to the school
segregation case is avoided, it must be recognized that the principal cause of
the present-day criticism of the Supreme Court is that decision. And, thus, the
Committee report, quite unintentionally but nonetheless actually exploits a hos-
tility to the Supreme Court bred of a decision (involved in current litigation)
which the report does not and could not properly discuss.
Harv. L. Bec., Oct. 23, 1958, p. 1, col. 1.
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unto itself the legislative function of Congress. With respect to the
first criterion, the old, familiar explanations of the reasons why the
Court must exercise this function still make good sense.0 Even such
staunch advocates of judicial self-restraint as Learned Hand believe
that the Court should check congressional action when Congress
patently and wantonly exceeds its constitutional power.Y As to the
second criterion, no one has ever argued with sophistication that the
Court should become a third legislative body and make law in the
manner of Congress and state legislatures. In attempting to ascertain
whether or not the Warren Court has complied with the two cri-
teria, we would do well to heed the advice of Governor Alfred E.
Smith: "Let's look at the record."
I. THE CouRT AND CoNcunsioNAL INVESTIGATIONS
The decision in Watkins v. United States 'I in which the Supreme
Court affirmed a witness' right to refuse to answer questions before
a congressional investigating committee, has been regarded by many
as proof of the cavalier attitude of the Warren Court toward Con-
gress. As pointed out earlier, Corwin felt that the decision was an
example of the Court's "putting its nose" into legislative business. 9
Many who felt that congressional investigations into Communism
and subversive activities had been fruitful were antagonized by the
decision. The American Bar Association's Special Committee on
Communist Tactics, Strategy, and Objectives, in its report of 1958,
quoted with approval a statement made by Judge Robert Morris,
former Chief Counsel of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee,
to the effect that "the power of the Congress to learn the underlying
facts of the [Communist] conspiracy has been hamstrung" since the
Watkins decision.20 Some members of Congress even sought legis-
16. See, e.g., THE FEDERALisT No. 78 (Hamilton); No. 48 (Madison). See
also the discussion by Marshall, C.J., in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137, 153-80 (1803). For modern views, see Rostow, The Supreme Court and the
People's Will, 38 Nom DANm LAw. 573 (1958); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Prin-
ciples of Constitutional Law, 73 Hxav. L. REv. 1 (1959).
17. Learned Hand's view on the matter is rather unique and interesting. He made
it clear that he felt that the Court must have authority to annul statutes whether
or not the framers of the Constitution intended it that way. Without this power,
Hand contended, "we should have to refer all disputes between the 'Departments'
[branches] and states to popular decision, patently an impractical means of relief,
whatever Thomas Jefferson may have thought." HAND, op. cit. supra note 4, at 66.
And the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association prefaced its resolution
criticizing the Warren Court with these words: "Whereas, the Supreme Court of the
United States and an independent judiciary created by the Constitution have been
and are the ultimate guardians of the Bill of Rights and the protectors of our free-
dom. ... N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1959, p. 25, col 1.
18. 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
19. See text accompanying notes 8 & 9 supra.
20. 104 CONe. R c. 19134 (1958). See also Cohn & Bolan, The Supreme Court
and the A.B.A. Report and Resolutions, 28 Foimsmm¢ L. REv. 233, 268-73 (1959).
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lation to remove cases like Watkins from the appellate jurisdiction
of the Court." Obviously, therefore, these strong views concerning
the impropriety of the Court's action in Watkins establish good
reason for examining here precisely what the Court actually did in
that case.
In his opinion for the majority, Mr. Chief Justice Warren said that
although the power of Congress to investigate is inherent and broad,
it is not constitutionally unlimited.2 He asserted:
There is no general authority to expose the private affairs of individuals
without justification in terms of the functions of the Congress. . . Nor is
the Congress a law enforcement or trial agency. These are functions of the
executive and judicial departments of government. No inquiry is an end in
itself; it must be related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of the
Congress. Investigations conducted solely for the personal aggrandizement
of the investigators or to "punish" those investigated are indefensible.23
He also said:
Clearly, an investigation is subject to the command that the Congress
shall make no law abridging freedom of speech or press or assembly.
While it is true that there is no statute to be reviewed, and that an investi-
gation is not a law, nevertheless an investigation is part of lawmaking. It is
justified solely as an adjunct to the legislative process. The First Amend-
ment may be invoked against infringement of the protected freedoms by
law or by lawmaking.24
Further, Warren indicated that the right to remain silent about "be-
liefs, expressions, or associations" was a necessary derivative from
first amendment rights, if those rights were to be meaningful. 25 Then
Warren pointed out that the Constitution places upon the judiciary
the responsibility "to insure that the Congress does not unjustifiably
encroach upon an individual's right to privacy nor abridge his lib-
erty of speech, press, religion or assembly."26
In view of Mr. Chief Justice Warren's sweeping language, it is not
suprising that the decision was construed by some as an indication
that the Court would confine conressional investigating power
within strict bounds. But the Courts recent decision in Barenblatt
v. United States28 makes meaningless any speculation regarding the
extent to which the Court will curb congressional investigations. Mr.
Justice Harlan, speaking for the five-member majority in Barenblatt,
made it clear that five out of the eight Justices who had comprised
21. S. 2646, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
22. 354 U.S. at 187.
23. Ibid.
24. Id. at 197.
25. Ibid.
26. Id. at 198-99.
27. See The Supreme Court, 1956 Term, 71 HAzv. L. REv. 83, 144-45 (1957);
Comment, 56 MIcH. L. Rzv. 272, 283-84 (1957).
28. 360 U.S. 109 (1959), rehearing denied, 361 U.S. 854 (1959).
[Vol. 44:595
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the majority in Watkins had not concurred in Warren's broad dicta:
A principle contention in Watkins was that the refusals to answer were
justified because the requirement . . . that the questions asked be "perti-
nent to the question under inquiry" had not been satisfied. This Court
reversed the conviction solely on that ground, holding that Watkins had
not been adequately apprised of the subject matter of the Subcommittees
investigation or the pertinency thereto of the questions he refused to
answer. 29
In short, the majority of the Warren Court, like most of their prede-
cessors, have not, and apparently will not, seriously limit the in-
vestigatory power of Congress.30
On the basis of Barenblatt a more valid indictment of the Court
might be that it has failed to hold congressional investigating power
within constitutional bounds. The Constitution clearly limits con-
gressional inquiries sharply by the first amendment and by the pro-
hibition against bills of attainder.31
Patently, the "right to silence" per se is not a first amendment free-
dom. But the first amendment does protect a witness who wishes to
remain silent when he is queried in such a way as to inhibit his exer-
cise of first amendment freedoms. For what may very well be in-
volved in questions relating to one's beliefs is "the right to affliate
freely with legal organizations and to advocate unpopular causes
which later prove inimical to national interests without the fear of
being penalized subsequently, rather than any general right to re-
main silent." 32 On the other hand, a witness being queried only
about his business transactions, for example, would be hard put to
demonstrate how his first amendment freedoms are being abridged.
Of course, any witness who is being questioned by a legislative com-
mittee clearly with the objective of punishing him is constitutionally
protected by the prohibition against bills of attainder, even where
he does not have the protection of the first amendment.
The majority in Barenblatt, however, agreed that the first amend-
ment applied in that case:
Undeniably, the First Amendment in some circumstances protects an
individual from being compelled to disclose his associational relationships.
However, the protections of the First Amendment, unlike a proper claim
of the privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment, do
not afford a witness the right to resist inquiry in all circumstances. Where
First Amendment rights are asserted to bar governmental interrogation,
29. Id. at 116-17. (Emphasis added.)
30. It could be argued that the Court in NAACP v. Alabama, 857 U.S. 449
(1958), did effectively place limits on judicial inquiries at the state level which
might be applicable to congressional investigations. But, if the Court climbed the
hill in that case, it climbed down again in Uphaus v. Wyman, 860 U.S. 72, rehearing
denied, 361 U.S. 856 (1959), a case dealing with state legislative investigative power
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
32. The Supreme Court, 1958 Term, 73 HARv. L. REv. 84, 160 (1959).
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resolution of the issue always involves a balancing by the courts of the
competing private and public interests at stake in the particular circum-
stances shown.33
If the first amendment applied in Barenblatt, as the majority ac-
ceded, from what part of the unequivocal language of that amend-
ment did the Court find a basis for exercising discretion to balance
competing private and public interests? True, previous Courts have
done so. But, as Mr. Justice Black argued persuasively in dissent:
To apply the Court's balancing test under such circumstances is to read
the First Amendment to say "Congress shall pass no law abridging free-
dom of speech, press, assembly and petition, unless Congress and the
Supreme Court reach the joint conclusion that on balance the interest of
the Government in stifling these freedoms is greater than the interest of
the people in having them exercised." This is closely akin to the notion
that neither the First Amendment nor any other provision of the Bill
of Rights should be enforced unless the Court believes it is reasonable to
do so. Not only does this violate the genius of our written Constitution,
but it runs expressly counter to, the injunction to Court and Congress made
by Madison when he introduced the Bill of Rights. "If they [the first ten
amendments] are incorporated into the Constitution, independent tribunals
of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of
those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assump-
tion of power in the Legislative or Executive; they will be naturally led to
resist every encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in the Con-
stitution by the declaration of rights." Unless we return to this view of
our judicial function, unless we once again accept the notion that the
Bill of Rights means what it says and that this Court must enforce that
meaning, I am of the opinion that our great charter of liberty will be
more honored in the breach than in the observance.3 4
Granted that first amendment freedoms are not absolute (however
meritorious the literal argument for that proposition may be,35 it is
too late in the game to assert it), nevertheless it is urged that the
presumptions should all be in favor of the exercise of freedom. Mr.
Justice Rutledge expressed the principle well in Thomas v. Collins:
The case confronts us again with the duty our system places on this
Court to say where the individual's freedom ends and the State's power
begins. Choice on that border, now as always delicate, is perhaps more
so where the usual presumption supporting legislation is balanced by the
preferred place given in our scheme to the great, the indispensable demo-
cratic freedoms secured by the First Amendment. . . . That priority gives
these liberties a sanctity and a sanction not permitting dubious intrusions.
And it is the character of the right, not of the limitation, which determines
what standard governs the choice ...
For these reasons any attempt to restrict those liberties must be justified
by clear public interest, threatened not doubtfully or remotely, but by
33. 360 U.S. at 126.
34. Id. at 143-44.
35. See MEnXLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITs RELATION TO SELF-GovERNMENT
(1948).
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clear and present danger. . . . Only the gravest abuses, endangering
paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation.36
But, even assuming that the balancing idea is valid in right to silence
cases,37 it does not appear that the majority applied it very well in
Barenblatt. As Black complained:
It is these interests of society, rather than Barenblatt's own right to silence,
which . . . the Court should put on the balance against the demands
of the Government . . Instead they are not mentioned, while on the
other side the demands of the Government are vastly overstated and called
"self preservation." 3
As to the dissenters' second assertion -that the congressional
subcommittee was attempting to punish Barenblatt contrary to the
constitutional prohibition against bills of attainder-the majority
wrote:
Nor can we accept the further contention that this investigation should
not be deemed to have been in furtherance of a legislative purpose be-
cause the true objective of the Committee and of the Congress was purely
.exposure." So long as Congress acts in pursuance of its constitutional
power, the Judiciary lacks authority to intervene on the basis of the mo-
tives which spiured the exercise of that power. .... 39
It is clear, then, that a majority of the Court will not prevent con-
gressional committees from using the investigatory power to punish
-an objective which is expressly banned by the Constitution. And
it has been obvious for some time, as the dissenters indicated in an
36. 323 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1945). See also Freeman, Civil Liberties-Acid Test
of Democracy, 43 MmN. L. REv. 511 (1959).
37. See Note, Legislative Inquiry Into Political Activity: First Amendment Immu-
nity From Committee Interrogation, 65 YALE L.J. 1159, 1172-79 (1956).
38. 360 U.S. at 144. The following represents a telling analysis of the balancing
done by the majority in Barenblatt:
Exposure alone hardly seems an adequate legislative end to justify subordination
of first-amendment guarantees, but the majority indicated that the Court will
not examine the motives of either Congress or the committee. While the Court
will not ordinarily invalidate legislation solely on the basis of the alleged motives
for its enactment, it seems that motivation should be considered in determining
the weight of the governmental interest if the balancing process required in the
present case is to be a meaningful one. The Court further indicated that it will
make no inquiry into the validity of the legislature's basic premise, here the
danger of the Communist conspiracy, but some examination along this line
would also seem necessary. Finally, the judicial inquiry into the relation between
the specific questions asked and the general legislative purpose seems at best
perfunctory in Barenblatt. In view of the seemingly inevitable result to which
such "balancing" will lead, the Court has apparently determined that the legis-
lative power to investigate subversives will outweigh the first-amendment inter-
ests upon which these inquiries may impinge unless the committee's conduct in
its totality indicates the use of "indiscriminate dragnet procedures" or a flagrant
disregard for the rights of its witnesses.
The Supreme Court, 1958 Term, 73 HAzv. L. REv. 84, 161 (1959).
39. 360 U.S. at 132. See also Calm, THE HousE Com ¢,xnrrr ON UN-AmucN
ArxTm~S, 1945-1950 (1952).
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appendix, 40 that the particular committee whose actions were chal-
lenged in Barenblatt has been bent upon punishing rather than in-
vestigating in the true sense of that word.
To sum up, despite the vigorous dissent by four justices in Baren-
blatt, a majority of the present Court has never imposed a meaning-
ful limitation on Congress' power to investigate. To the contrary, in
the area of legislative investigations, the Court has failed to fulfil its
responsibility of defending constitutional liberties against encroach-
ment by Congress.
II. CASES IN WMCH THE CouRT HAs DE CLARED STATUTORY
PROVISIONS UNcoNSTunONAL
In six years the Warren Court has unequivocally declared only
three congressional enactments unconstitutional. 41 Granted, it re-
quired six strokes of the judicial sword to render one provision life-
less.42 And, the Court decided one case in such a way as to effec-
tively strike down several other statutory provisions, even though it
avoided expressly saying so.43 Whatever the precise number of War-
ren Court declarations of unconstitutionality, that number is mini-
mal and hardly substantiates the oft-quoted criticism that the
Warren Court is running roughshod over Congress. True, while
Vinson served as Chief Justice over a comparable span, the Court
never declared an act of Congress unconstitutional. But the Vinson
Court was unduly permissive about allowing inroads to be made on
the Bill of Rights.44 It would be fairer, perhaps, to compare the rec-
ord of the Warren Court with that of another which was frequently
charged with treating Congress cavalierly-the Hughes Court,
which in the much shorter period of 1934-1936 overruled twelve acts
of Congress.4 5 However, quantitative analysis is of only limited use-
fulness in evaluating accusations made against the Warren Court, for
even if the Court checked congressional power only a few times
arbitrarily, it would have been exceeding its power. An analysis of
the pertinent Warren Court decisions will answer the query con-
cerning the arbitrariness of its action.
40. 360 U.S. at 163.
41. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957);
United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
42. See Grisham v. Hagan, 861 U.S. 278 (1960); McElroy v. United States ex rel.
Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960); Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361
U.S. 234 (1960).
43. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
44. PmTcsm-r, Cnim LmERTES AND VINSON COURT 238 passim (1954).
45. LEGIsLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE, LPRARY OF CONGRESS, TaE CONSTrTION
OF THE UNrrED STATES 1252-54 (Corwin ed. 1953).
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A. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles 4
In 1950, Congress enacted the widely-heralded Uniform Code of
Military Justice. Attempting to plug what it deemed a lacuna in
the law-the lack of provision for trying ex-servicemen for crimes
punishable under military law and committed while in the service
- Congress considered a proposal presented by the Judge Advocate
General of the Army. He had urged Congress to
confer jurisdiction upon Federal courts to try any person for an offense
denounced by the code if he is no longer subject thereto. This would be
consistent with the fifth amendment of the Constitution .... If you ex-
pressly confer jurisdiction on the Federal courts to try such cases, you
preserve the constitutional separation of military and civil courts, you save
the military from a lot of unmerited grief, and you provide for a clean,
constitutional method for disposing of such cases.48
However, Congress rejected this suggestion and enacted the follow-
ing provision instead:
[Any person charged with having committed, while in a status in which
he was subject to this code, an offense against this code, punishable by
confinement of five years or more and for which the person cannot be tried
in the courts of the United States or any State or Territory thereof or of
the District of Columbia, shall not be relieved from amenability to trial
by courts-martial by reason of the termination of said status. 49
In United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, the first Supreme Court
decision involving this provision of the code, the Warren Court de-
clared it unconstitutional."0
In the Toth case, all nine Justices agreed that, if Congress had the
power to turn ex-servicemen over to the military for trial by court-
martial for crimes committed while in the service, Congress derived
that power from the constitutional provision directing Congress "to
make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and
naval Forces," as supplemented by the necessary and proper
clause.51 All nine Justices further agreed that under these provisions
persons currently in the armed services could constitutionally be
subjected to trial by court-martial for military offenses.5 2 And all but
two of the Justices agreed that ex-servicemen were full-fledged civil-
ians and, as such, were entitled to the protections afforded by article
46. 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
47. See generally Snedeker, The Uniform Code of Military Justice, 38 GEo. L.J.
521 (1950).
48. Hearings on S. 857 and H.R. 4080 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Com-
mittee on Armed Services, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 256-57 (1949).
49. Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 3(a), 64 Stat. 109-10 (1950).
50. 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
51. Id. at 14, 31.
52. Id. at 14, 28.
1960]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
III and the Bill of Rights. 3 At this point, however, the unanimity of
the other seven Justices also dissolved. The five-Justice majority
implied that, since article III and the Bill of Rights were applicable,
the scope of the constitutional grant of power to Congress had to be
construed more strictly than where no other constitutional provi-
sions run counter to a power of Congress?4 For the majority, then,
determination of constitutionality hinged upon the question wheth-
er or not it was essential to the making of "Rules for the Government
and Regulation of the land and naval Forces" to try ex-servicemen
by court-martial for crimes committed while in service.5 The major-
ity answered this in the negative:
Court-martial jurisdiction sprang from the belief that within the mili-
tary ranks there is need for a prompt, ready-at-hand means of compelling
obedience and order. But Army discipline will not be improved by court-
martialing rather than trying by jury some civilian ex-soldier who has
been wholly separated from the service for months, years or perhaps
decades. Consequently considerations of discipline provide no excuse for
new expansion of court-martial jurisdiction at the expense of the normal
and constitutionally preferable system of trial by jury.56
In view of the testimony of the Judge Advocate General of the
Army, it would be difficult to conclude that the Court was arbitrarily
curbing Congress rather than merely upholding the Constitution.17
B. Reid v. Covert5" and Progeny 59
Within two years after the decision in Toth, another provision of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice was challenged in the Supreme
Court. This provision made the Code applicable to "all persons serv-
ing with, employed by, or accompanying the armed forces without
the continental limits of the United States."60 Two servicemen's
wives who were accused of murdering their husbands were tried and
convicted in court-martial proceedings. When the constitutionality
of Congress' conferral of military jurisdiction in cases of crimes com-
mitted by dependents overseas was initially questioned, a majority
of the Court found Congress' action constitutional."' On its face such
53. Mr. Justice Minton, whom Mr. Justice Burton joined in a separate dissent,
wrote: "My trouble is that I don't think Toth was a full-fledged civilian." Id. at 44.
54. Id. at 21-22.
55. Id. at 13-14.
56. Id. at 22-23.
57. But see Willis, Toth v. Quarles- For Better or For Worse?, 9 VAND. L. REv.
534 (1956); 40 MiNN. L. REv. 705 (1956).
58. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
59. See note 42 supra.
60. Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 2(11), 64 Stat. 109 (1950).
61. Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487 (1956); Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470
(1956).
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a decision seemed difficult to square with the decision in Toth. 2 But
Mr. Justice Clark speaking for the majority in Kinsella v. Krueger
said that the distinction was that the wives, at the time of their
court-martial, were citizens in a foreign country. His words were:
Entirely aside from the power of Congress under Article III of the Con-
stitution, it has been well-established since Chief Justice Marshall's opinion
in American Insurance Co. v. Canter . . . that Congress may establish
legislative courts outside the territorial limits of the United States proper.
The procedure in such tribunals need not comply with the standards pre-
scribed by the Constitution for Article III courts. 63
Since Congress could set up legislative courts, he concluded that
they could constitutionally "employ the existing system of courts-
martial for this purpose" as well.64 Mr. Chief Justice Warren and
Justices Black and Douglas dissented but indicated that the many
cases to be decided in the closing days of the term precluded their
writing dissenting opinions."u In reserving judgment, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter also relied on shortness of time as an excuse; he said
that he did not have sufficient time to reflect on the issues involved,
for "Reflection is a slow process. Wisdom, like good wine, requires
maturing." 66
Subsequently, the Court reheard the cases and decided 6-2, one
Justice taking no part, that the previous decisions could not be per-
mitted to stand-that the wives could not constitutionally be tried
by courts-martial. 7 This was not a capricious changing of minds.
But, since the Warren Court is sometimes charged with reversing
itself irrationally,68 it is worth examining what actually did happen.
Five Justices maintained their previous positions on constitutionality
of the disputed provision, Justices Clark and Burton now in dissent,
and Justices Black, Douglas and the Chief Justice now in the ma-
jority. Mr. Justice Frankfurter had by this time completed his reflec-
tion on the issues and now concurred in the result of unconstitution-
62. The Krueger and Covert majority might have distinguished the Toth decision
by asserting that there are degrees of connection with the military and by
finding that these civilians bad a sufficient nexus at the time of arrest to warrant
court-martial under the war powers. The majority chose, instead, to base military
jurisdiction on congressional power to provide overseas legislative courts, and
its result is therefore dependent upon the making of the arrest outside of the
territorial limits of the United States. For both Krueger and Toth to remain
persuasive authority, the significance of Toth must be restricted to cases in
which the discharged serviceman is apprehended in the United States.
The Supreme Court, 1955 Term, 70 HAlv. L. RE;. 83, 111 (1956).
63. 351 U.S. 470, 474-75 (1956).
64. Id. at 476, 480.
65. Id. at 486.
66. Id. at 485.
67. Reid v. Covert, 854 U.S. 1 (1957).
68. See, e.g., Cohn & Bolan, supra note 20, at 244.
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ality. Mr. Justice Brennan, who had replaced Mr. Justice Minton
on the Court, also joined in the new majority; Minton had been on
the other side. Mr. Justice Whittaker, the most recent addition to the
Court as of this time, took no part in the decision; 69 his predecessor,
Mr. Justice Reed, had ruled in favor of constitutionality. In short,
Mr. Justice Harlan was the only member who had actually changed
the position he asserted originally. And with refreshing candor, he
stated that additional reflection on the issues had convinced him he
had been wrong.70 He made clear, however, that he had changed his
mind only on the narrow ground "that where the offense is capital,
Article 2 (11) [the provision of the Code in dispute] cannot constitu-
tionally be applied to the trial of civilian dependents of members of
the armed forces overseas in times of peace.7
In the view of the Chief Justice and Justices Black, Douglas, and
Brennan, the important consideration was that the wives were
civilians, even though they were at overseas posts, and as civilians
they were entitled to the same constitutional protection they would
have were they stationed at posts in the United States. Conse-
quently, for these Justices the reasoning of the Toth decision was
both applicable and persuasive. They left open the question of
whether or not servicemen's dependents could be subjected to the
Code in "an area where active hostilities were under way."72
Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurred in the result but indicated that
like Mr. Justice Harlan, he, too, might have decided in favor of
unconstitutionality only because a capital offense was involved."'
Thus, after Reid v. Covert two questions remained unanswered
concerning article 2(11) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice:
(1) Could dependents be tried by courts-martial for noncapital of-
69. In recent decisions, Mr. Justice Whittaker has sided with the majority in
extending the Reid v. Covert holding of unconstitutionality to noncapital offenses
committed by civilian dependents overseas. Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Single-
ton, 361 U.S. 234, 259 (1960) (Whittaker, J., concurring). However, he has taken the
position that civilian employees of overseas military forces are not entitled to the
same protection afforded civilian dependents overseas under the language of Reid
v. Covert. McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281, 287 (1960)
(Whittaker, J., dissenting); Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278, 280 (1960) (Whittaker,
J., dissenting). He was joined both in dissent and concurrence by Mr. Justice Stewart.
70. 354 U.S. at 65.
71. Ibid. He reaffirmed this position in recent cases. Kinsella v. United States
ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 249 (1960) (Harlan, J., dissenting); McElroy v.
United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281, 287 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Grisham
v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278, 280 (Harlan, J., concurring).
72. Id. at 33-4.
73. Id. at 64. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's words were:
What has been urged on us falls far too short of proving a well-established
practice- to be deemed to be infused into the Constitution- of court-martial
jurisdiction, certainly not in capital cases, over such civilians in time of peace.
He reaffirmed this position by joining with Mr. Justice Harlan in the recent relevant
decisions. See note 71 supra.
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fenses? (2) Would civilian employees of the armed services be
accorded the same treatment by the Court as dependents? Recently,
the Court answered these questions in decisions which, taken to-
gether with Reid v. Covert, have administered the coup de grace
to article 2(11) of the Code. The Court has decided that neither
dependents nor civilian employees overseas with the armed forces
may be tried by courts-martial in either capital or noncapital eases. 74
True, these decisions have created a situation where, as of this
writing, there are no provisions at all for trying in United States
courts civilian employees and dependents who commit crimes over-
seas. Yet, in determining whether the Court has been arbitrary in
these decisions, the words of Mr. Justice Black concerning the lower
court decisions in the Covert case are worth pondering:
These cases raise basic constitutional issues of the utmost concern. They
call into question the role of the military under our system of government.
They involve the power of Congress to expose civilians to trial by mili-
tary tribunals, under military regulations and procedures, for offensesagainst the United States thereby depriving them of trial in civilian courts,under civilian laws and procedures and with all the safeguards of theBill of Bights. These cases are particularly significant becase for the first
time since the adoption of the Constitution wives of soldiers have been
denied trial by jury in a court of law and forced to trial before courts-
martial."
5
Once it is established that the Constitution forbids the use of courts-
martial for overseas dependents in capital cases, it would seem to
follow, as Mr. Justice Clark asserted for the majority in the recent
Singleton decision, that the Constitution similarly bans the use of
courts-martial for overseas dependents in noncapital cases. 6 Nor
74. Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960) (noncapital,
civilian dependent case); McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281
(1960) (noncapital, civilian employee case); Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960)
(capital, civilian employee case).
75. 354 U.S. at 3 (announcing the judgment of the Court and delivering an opinion
concurred in by three other Justices). But see McLaren, Constitutional Law: Military
Trials of Civilians, 45 A.B.A.J. 255 (1959).
76. Mr. Justice Clark's reasoning was as follows:
We now reach the Government's suggestion that, in the light of the non-
capital nature of the offense here, as opposed to the capital one in the Covert
case, we should make a "fresh evaluation and a new balancing." But the power
to "make Rules for the government and Regulation of the land and naval
Forces" bears no limitation as to offenses. The power there granted includes
not only the creation of offenses but the fixing of the punishment therefor. If
civilian dependents are included in the term "land and naval Forces" at all, they
are subject to the full power granted the Congress therein to create capital as
well as noncapital offenses. This Court cannot diminish and expand that power,
either on a case-by-case basis or on a balancing of the power there granted
Congress against the safeguards of Article IH and the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments. Due process cannot create or enlarge power.
Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 246 (1960). Justices Harlan
and Frankfurter argued that the Court has in other contexts permitted a constitutional
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does it seem unreasonable to assert, as Clark also has, that one class
of civilians must be treated like another when overseas with the
armed forces.77
C. Trop v. Dulles 78
In a 5-4 decision in 1958, the Court declared unconstitutional a
statutory provision which stripped citizenship from any person con-
victed of desertion in wartime by a court-martial proceeding.79 To
understand fully the opinions in the Trop case requires conjunctive
consideration of the opinions in Perez v. Brownell," a case decided
the same day, in which a five-member majority decided that a statu-
tory provision calling for loss of citizenship for a person voting in a
foreign election was constitutional. Three of the four Justices who
concurred in the opinion of the Court in Trop -Mr. Chief Justice
Warren and Justices Black and Douglas -had maintained in dissent
in Perez that under no circumstances could Congress constitutionally
deprive a citizen of his citizenship. s -They had pointed out that the
Constitution provides that "'all persons born or naturalized in the
United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of
the United States.' 82 They thought it noteworthy that, although the
Constitution provides that citizenship may be granted under a
"'uniform Rule of Naturalization' . . . there is no corresponding
provision authorizing divestment."88 But since the majority had
rejected their basic contention in Perez, these three Justices pro-
ceeded in Trop on the assumption that there were times when Con-
gress might be able to constitutionally expatriate citizens.8 4 Even
assuming that Congress did have such power, the three felt that
expatriation as punishment was precluded by the eighth amendment
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments.85 Presumably
Mr. Justice Whittaker, who joined with the majority in Trop, did so
on the grounds of the eighth amendment, for he specifically stated
distinction between capital and noncapital cases: "Thus, this Court has held that the
Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant
in a capital case . . . whereas in noncapital cases a defendant has no such absolute
right to counsel. McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281, 255
(1960) (Harlan, J., dissenting). But the due process clause alows more leeway
for making such distinctions than do the fifth and sixth amendments.
77. McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 861 U.S. 281, 283-84 (1960).
But see the view of Justices Whittaker and Stewart, supra note 69.
78. 856 U.S. 86 (1958).
79. ibid.
80. 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
81. 356 U.S. at 92 (opinion of Warren, C.J.).
82. 356 U.S. at 65 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 66. This, they said, did not, however, preclude naturalization from being
set aside if unlawfully procured. Ibid.
84. 356 U.S. at 93 (opinion of Warren, C.J.).
85. Id. at 101.
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in a separate opinion in Perez that Congress could under some cir-
cumstances constitutionally expatriate a citizen. 6 Mr. Justice Bren-
nan, who had joined in the decision denying Perez citizenship, took
great pains in a separate opinion to explain that he was not being
inconsistent by voting for unconstitutionality in the Trop case. 7 He
maintained that the distinguishing factor was that the provision
challenged in Perez was a lawful exercise of Congress' power to
regulate the conduct of foreign affairs,s whereas the expatriation-
for-desertion statute was not reasonably related to Congress' war
power.89 In short, the reasoning on which the majority seemed to
jell in Trop was that expatriation is not a constitutionally allowable
punishment for desertion." However, the dissenters, Justices Frank-
furter, Burton, Clark, and Harlan, thought Congress could, in the
exercise of its war power, expatriate wartime deserters. Unlike Mr.
Justice Brennan, they felt there was a "rational nexus between re-
fusal to perform this ultimate duty of American citizenship and
legislative withdrawal of that citizenship." 91 Coming to grips with
the majority position that expatriation was an unduly harsh punish-
ment, Mr. Justice Frankfurter pointed out that desertion was punish-
able by death, and he posed the rhetorical question: "Is constitutional
dialectic so empty of reason that it can be seriously urged that loss
of citizenship is a fate worse than death?" 2 But this begs the ques-
tion. Undoubtedly, there are punishments short of death that civi-
lized people regard as being cruel and unusual. One can be sure that
Mr. Justice Frankfurter would regard mutilation or castration as a
cruel and unusual punishment for even the most heinous crimes,
though the victim survived. Perhaps the majority did overdramatize
the consequences of expatriation, but certainly it seems that they
were not acting arbitrarily in finding that expatriation was "a form
of punishment more primitive than torture" and that "the expatriate
has lost the right to have rights."9 3
D. Bolling v. Sharpe94
In Bolling v. Sharpe, a companion case to Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation,95 the Court scrupulously avoided any indication that it was
86. 356 U.S. at 84 (memorandum of Whittaker, J.).
87. 356 U.S. 86, 105 (1958).
88. Ibid.
89. Id. at 107.
90. It is interesting to speculate on how the Supreme Court would rule on a case
involving loss of citizenship as a punishment for some criminal charge other than
desertion. See, e.g., the relatively new provision for loss of citizenship for conviction
under the Smith Act. 68 Stat. 1146 (1954), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1481(9) (Supp. 1959).
91. 356 U.S. at 122.
92. Id. at 125.
93. Id. at 101-02.
94. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
95. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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declaring an act of Congress unconstitutional. Perhaps it was not.
But the fact remains that Congress, in its role as lawmaker for the
District of Columbia, had in the past enacted laws which surely
seemed to require racial segregation in the District of Columbia
schools. 6 Because the equal protection clause applies only to the
states, the Court obviously had difficulty basing the Bolling decision
on specific constitutional grounds. Mr. Chief Justice Warren asserted
for a unanimous Court that the due process clause prohibited segre-
gation:
The "equal protection of the laws" is a more explicit safeguard of pro-
hibited unfairness than "due process of law," and, therefore, we do not
imply that the two are always interchangeable phrases. But, as this Court
has recognized, discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of
due process.97
But even to invoke the due process clause, the Court had to read
new meaning into "liberty' in the fifth amendment. This the Court
did:
Segregation in public education is not reasonably related to any proper
governmental objective, and thus it imposes on Negro children of the
District of Columbia a burden that constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of
their liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause.98
Surely, the real basis for the decision must have been the Court's
conviction that, regardless of the absence of an "equal protection"
clause in the fifth amendment, "in view of our decision that the
Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining racially segre-
gated public schools, it would be unthinkable that the same Consti-
tution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government." 99
If the Constitution did prevent segregation in the schools of the
states, it would indeed be a ludicrous result for the schools in the
District of Columbia to remain segregated.
E. Summary
In summary, it seems clear that the Court has not arbitrarily
curbed congressional power in the cases in which it has declared
an act of Congress unconstitutional. In all of these cases, important
rights were at stake, rights which seem to have firm constitutional
bases. Surely, a majority of the Supreme Court was not acting arbi-
trarily when it found constitutional basis for withholding civilians
from trial by the military, insisting on desegregation of the District
96. For a review of relevant congressional enactments, see Carr v. Coming, 182
F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
97. 847 U.S. at 499.
98. Id. at 500.
99. Ibid.
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of Columbia schools, and refusing to allow a citizen to be deprived
of citizenship as punishment.100 The position that these decisions
do not represent a wanton lack of deference toward Congress is
strengthened by the fact that they are not the exclusive property
of the so-called "activists," Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan, and
the Chief Justice, as indicated by the following tabulation:
Boiling Toth Covert Trop Singleton Cuagliardo Crisham
Warren M M M M M M M
Black M M M M M M M
Douglas M M M M M M M
Brennan M M M M M
Frankfurter M M M D D D M
Clark M M D D M M M
Harlan M M D D D M
Burton M D D D
Whittaker * M
Stewart .. .. M D D
Minton M D ..
Reed M D .. ..
Jackson M .. .. ..
9-0 6-3 6-2 5-4 7-2 5-4 7-2
Key: M = Majority; D = Dissent; * = Not participating.
HI. CASES IN WHICH THE COURT ALLEGEDLY AvomED CONSTU0tONAL
QUESTIONS BmT STIL TIawARTED CoNxGRss' EXERCISE OF ITS
CONSTITUTIONAL POWERs
Critics have charged that the Warren Court has frequently
thwarted Congress' exercise of constitutional powers even when si-
multaneously professing to avoid the constitutional issues in the
case. The argument is that the Court, unwilling to challenge Con-
gress' power openly prefers to do it surreptitiously when Congress
exercises power in ways which the members of the Court personally
disapprove.'0 ' Some credence is lent to this theory even by some of
100. There may be significance in the fact that, exclusive of the segregation case,
all these cases involve the military, and that the real meaning to be drawn from
the cases may be that the Court is especially watchful where Congress bestows
power on the military because the ordinary political checks that operate on Congress
and the administration do not operate as effectively on the military. For example,
it is more difficult for the press and the public to learn what the military is doing.
101. Mr. Justice Clark apparently takes this view, as indicated by the following
excerpt from one of his dissents:
[The Court] refuses to pass on the important questions relating to the constitu-
tionality of the Internal Security Act of 1950, a bulwark of the congressional
program to combat the menace of world Communism. Believing that the Court
here disregards its plain responsibility and duty to decide these important consti-
tutional questions, I cannot join in its action.
I have not found any case in the history of the Court where important consti-
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the Court's staunchest defenders. For example, Professor C. Herman
Pritchett apparently believes that in critical cases the Court has
often avoided consideration of the question of Congress' constitu-
tional powers for reasons of expediency rather than principle. He
has argued that for political reasons the Court must use extreme
care in exercising the power to declare acts of Congress unconstitu-
tional.12 Yet, Pritchett urges, neither can the Court stand by and
watch Congress decimate the Bill of Rights. It has the obligation of
bringing to bear its judgment on the pressing policy issues of the
day.0 3 But, as he recently pointed out, the Court need not reach the
basic question of Congress' constitutional power in order to bring
to bear its judgment on important policy issues.'0 4 He feels that the
Court has consciously developed a technique for limiting the con-
stitutional power of Congress by deciding cases on subsidiary issues
which in effect challenge that power. And he finds that technique
commendable, for, although Congress may by simple legislation
parry the thrust of the Court's decision, Congress must at least con-
sider the issues again.
It is difficult, however, to agree with Pritchett on several scores.
First, there is no evidence that a majority of the Court have deliber-
ately decided that they will avoid constitutional issues and yet re-
strain Congress in the cases Pritchett relied on to make the point,
tutional issues have been avoided on such a pretext.
Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 351 U.S. 115, 127-28
(1956) (dissenting opinion).
102. He said:
The Court can be imprudent only at its peril. The power of judicial review is
too important, and the Court's position intrinsically too weak, to permit the
making of too many mistakes. Self-restraint counsels the Court to reach consti-
tutional issues reluctantly and to be chary of disagreeing with legislatures or
executives, whether national or state.
PmTCsTT, THE AMERIcAN CONSTITUON 154 (1959).
Previously, he had indicated the basis for this opinion:
The grave risks run by a Court which rejects the counsel of self-restraint were
demonstrated in 1935 and 1936. That Court was willing to risk a test of its
authority in defense of its interpretation of the Constitution, and in opposition
to an enormously popular legislative and executive program. That effort to
block the President and Congress was a miscalculation which for a time jeopard-
ized the entire institution of judicial review.
Pritchett, The Supreme Court Today: Constitutional Interpretation and Judicial
Self-Restraint, 3 S.D.L. REv. 51, 63 (1958).
103. He said:
But self-restraint is not the ultimate in judicial wisdom. The Court's primary
obligation is not to avoid controversy. Its primary obligation is to bring all the
judgment its members possess and the best wisdom that the times afford, to
the interpretation of the basic rules propounded by the Constitution for the
direction of a free society. The Supreme Court has a duty of self-restraint, but
not to the point of denying to the nation the guidance on basic democratic
problems which its unique situation equips it to provide.
PRrrmcET, op. cit. supra note 102, at 154.
104. Ford Lectures, University of Minnesota, April 20-22, 1959.
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that is, Yates,105 the security program cases,106 and the passport
cases. 07 A more plausible inference to be drawn from these cases is
that a majority of the Court will not quarrel about the constitutional
limits of congressional power. Nor will the majority quarrel about
how the power is exercised in these cases, even where fundamental
liberties are involved, as long as there is clear indication that it is
being exercised in accord with Congress' expressed and specific
intent.
Second, it is obvious that the Court did not really avoid criticism
by not deciding these cases on the issue of Congress' constitutional
power. Would any more heated criticism have been generated from
certain quarters if, for example, in Yates the Court had declared the
Smith Act unconstitutional? 08
Third, assuming that it is the duty of the Court to uphold the
Constitution, these decisions were hardly great victories for individ-
ual freedom. Although the narrow holdings of the cases may seem
to be such victories, the Court has in fact strengthened the bases
for the making of substantial inroads into the safeguards for individ-
ual liberty contained in the Constitution.
A. Yates v. United States 0 9
Foremost among these cases is Yates v. United States, in which
only two Justices, Black and Douglas, were willing to hold the
Smith Act unconstitutional." 0 The majority, in an opinion written
by Mr. Justice Harlan, pointedly declined to discuss the question
of the constitutionality of the Smith Act: "We need not, however,
decide the issue before us in terms of constitutional compulsion, for
our flrst duty is to construe this statute." ' They clearly indicated
by their decision, however, that the Smith Act was constitutional
and, that if it was carefully applied by the government along the
lines they suggested, they would uphold future convictions under
105. 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
106. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959); Service v. Dulles, 854 U.S. 868
(1957); Cole v. Young, 851 U.S. 536 (1956).
107. Dayton v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 144 (1958); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
Pritchett also used Watkins v. United States, 854 U.S. 178 (1957), to make his
point, but that was before the Barenblatt decision.
United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441 (1958), is also an excellent
example of the Court's avoiding the constitutional issue in a case where it neverthe-
less rendered void a congressional enactment. However, Professor Pritchett has not
used this case to support his theory.
108. See ABA, SpEcAY CoaNsrrnu oN Com-vNuST TAcrIcs, STRATEGY, AND
OBJEcTAvEs, RESOLunON AN REPORT (1959), published in 104 CONG. REc. 19132
(1958); Cohn & Bolan, The Supreme Court and the A.B.A. Report and Resolutions,
28 For n m. L. REv. 283, 279-83 (1959).
109. Yates v. United States, 854 U.S. 298 (1957).
110. Id. at 339 (dissenting in part).
III. Id. at 819.
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the law." 2 They left the way open, too, for Congress to redefine
parts of the statute, implying that certain redefinitions would be
constitutionally acceptable. 113 In view of the nature of the statute
and the danger it was contrived and has been applied to meet, the
Court was certainly exhibiting deference to Congress. Without tak-
ing an absolutist position that the first amendment means what it
says- "Congress shall pass no law . . "- it is clear that, if it is
to have any meaning, restrictions on free speech must be justified by
the gravest kind of danger. As we must appreciate by now, the
danger presented by American Communists was not and is not from
their advocacy of overthrow of the government." 4 Moreover, other
laws were and are available to meet the very real dangers of espio-
nage, sabotage, and seditious conspiracy, when the talk of the Com-
munists becomes overt action." 5 Mr. Justice Black's opinion in
Yates, in which Mr. Justice Douglas joined, is a more persuasive
interpretation of the real issues in Yates than the majority opinion:
In essence, petitioners were tried upon the charge that they believe in
and want to foist upon this country a different and to us a despicable
form of authoritarian government in which voices criticizing the existing
order are summarily silenced. I fear that the present type of prosecutions
are more in line with the philosophy of authoritarian government than
with that expressed by our First Amendment.116
The law on the subject, as stated in the opinion of Mr. Justice
Harlan in the Yates case, hardly represents a victory for liber-
tarian values. Instead, that decision fortifies the concept that
Congress may constitutionally abridge free speech for less than the
most pressing reasons.
B. The Loyalty-Security Program Cases
It has been alleged that the Court thwarted Congress' exercise of
constitutional power and jeopardized national security by its de-
cisions in cases involving dismissal of government and private em-
ployees under government security programs, notably in Cole v.
Young,"7 Service v. Dulles,"' and Greene v. McElroy."9 The statute
involved in the Cole case empowered the heads of certain agencies
to summarily dismiss their civilian employees, when they deemed
112. Id. at 334.
113. Id. at 309-10.
114. See CHASE, SEcunrrY AND IJBERY 1-10 (1955).
115. Id. at 24.
110. 354 U.S. at 343 (dissenting in part). The majority merely required a new
trial. justices Black and Douglas would have acquitted the defendants.
117. 351 U.S. 536 (1956).
118. 354 U.S. 363 (1957).
119. 360 U.S. 474 (1959). See also Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955), which
did not directly involve an act of Congress.
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dismissal necessary in the interest of national security. 2 ' Without
reaching any constitutional questions, a majority of six Justices, de-
cided that the proper interpretation of the statute precluded sum-
mary dismissals from nonsensitive positions. 2' The Service case
involved a government employee who had been dismissed by the
State Department under the so-called McCarran Rider, passed by
Congress, which gave the Secretary of State power "in his absolute
discretion [to] terminate the employment of any officer or employee
of the Department." 122 Yet, all participating members of the
Court 23 found no constitutional question involved. 4 Instead, their
decision to remand the case purportedly was based on the fact that
the Secretary in this case had not followed the exact procedure pre-
scribed by departmental regulations:
While it is of course true that under the McCarran Rider the Secretary
was not obligated to impose upon himself these more rigorous substantive
and procedural standards, neither was he prohibited from doing so, as
we have already held, and having done so he could not, so long as the
Regulations remained unchanged, proceed without regard to them.125
These decisions, considered with Greene v. McElroy, in which the
Court held that the Defense Department has no authority to refuse
a private employee a security clearance without affording him rights
of confrontation, demonstrate that the Court was not limiting Con-
gress' power. Rather they reveal that the Court was disturbed, as
well it might be, about the way the various security programs were
being administered.26 As the nearly unanimous Court said in
Greene:
Before we are asked to judge whether, in the context of security clearance
cases, a person may be deprived of the right to follow his chosen profession
without full hearings where accusers may be confronted, it must be made
clear that the President or Congress, within their respective constitutional
powers, specifically has decided that the imposed procedures are necessary
and warranted and has authorized their use. . . . Such decisions cannot
be assumed by acquiescence or non-action. They must be made explicitly
not only to assure that individuals are not deprived of cherished rights
under procedures not actually authorized, but also because explicit action,
especially in areas of doubtful constitutionality, requires careful and pur-
120. 851 U.S. at 538.
121. Id. at 557.
122. 65 Stat. 581 (1951).
123. Mr. Justice Clark did not participate.
124. 354 U.S. at 378.
125. Id. at 888.
126. For other criticism of the security programs see BRowN, LOYALTY AND SECUR-
rr (1958); STAFF OF SENATE CoNvO-rrrEE ON PosT OFFICE AND CIviL SEIWicE,
84Tn CONG., 2D SEss., AnDms;rmATioN OF TE FEDERAL EMLOYEES' SECURITY
PROGRAm (1956); COmmISsSION ON GOvERNmENT SECURITY, REPORT (1957); NEw
Yoax CrrY BAR AssOCIATION SPECIAL CONMURrE ON THE FEDERAL LOYALTY-
SECUTY PROGRAM, REPORT (1956).
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poseful consideration by those responsible for enacting and implementing
our laws. 127
Justices Frankfurter, Harlan, and Whittaker, concurred in the judg-
ment that neither Congress nor the President had authorized the
procedures but took pains to add that they were "intimating no
views as to the validity of those procedures." 12 Despite the major-
ity's insistence that it was not reaching the constitutional issue, it
seems apparent that if the Court felt that nonconfrontation was un-
constitutional per se it is doubtful that it would have considered
whether Congress or the President had in fact authorized such pro-
cedures. 29 Obviously, neither the President nor Congress could
make nonconfrontation satisfy due process requirements in criminal
cases. Nor would the Court concern itself with the question of what
the President or Congress expressly meant to do in deciding that
nonconfrontation in that context was unconstitutional. All the Court
seemed to be requiring of the Administration in the Greene case was
a clear indication that the programs were to be administered pre-
cisely as Congress or the President specified. Evidently, the Admin-
istration so construes the holding in Greene. For, recently, the Presi-
dent issued an executive order the main thrust of which is to delimit
the use of non-confrontation in the industrial security program, but
which, on the other hand, specifically provides for non-confrontation
in some circumstances 30
From the standpoint of libertarian values, the decisions in these
cases leave something to be desired. Most libertarians would not
quarrel with the assertion that Congress has the constitutional power
to set up security programs, nor would they dispute the need for
them."' - What libertarians should and do insist upon is that proce-
dures set up in such programs meet the constitutional requirement
of due process.' 3' It is too late in the game to accept the proposition
that working for the government is a "privilege" rather than a "right"
and that consequently the fifth amendment does not apply. As Mr.
Justice Clark conceded in Wieman v. Updegraff,133 "We need not
pause to consider whether an abstract right to public employment
exists. It is sufficient to say that constitutional protection does extend
127. 860 U.S. at 507.
128. Id. at 508 (concurring opinion).
129. See Rauh, Nonconfrontation In Security Cases: The Greene Decision, 45 VA.
L. REv. 1175 (1959). But see Horn, The Warren Court and the Discretionary Powers
of the Executive, 44 MINN. L. REV. 639, 653-54 (1960).
130. Exec. Order No. 10865, 25 Fed. Reg. 1583 (1960). Congress is considering
legislation to buttress the Presidential Order. 106 CONG. Rac. 2908 (daily ed. Feb.
23, 1960) (remarks of Senator Keating).
131. See BROWN, op. cit. supra note 126, at 463; CHASE, op. cit. supra note 114,
at 55.
132. Ibid.
133. 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
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to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is pat-
ently arbitrary or discriminatory." 34 Yet these decisions virtually
invite the Administration to establish procedures for implementing
the security programs which inherently are so unfair as to violate
due process.131
C. The Passport Cases 13
The Court's decisions in the passport cases in 1958 brought fur-
ther charges that it had placed the security of the republic in jeop-
ardy.137 The state department was distressed enough by these de-
cisions to entreat the President to call for quick legislative action,
presumably to overcome the danger created by large numbers of
suspected subversives traveling abroad.138 Although an old statute
had provided that the Secretary of State could "grant and issue pass-
ports ...under such rules as the President shall designate," 139 the
decisions in these cases placed no curb on congressional power. The
Court in two five-four decisions found only that the Secretary of
State had no "authority to withhold passports to citizens because of
their beliefs or associations" unless there was a more specific grant
from Congress empowering him to do so. 4' Mr. Justice Douglas,
speaking for a majority, said: "Vhere activities or enjoyment, na-
tural and often necessary to the well-being of an American citizen,
such as travel, are involved, we will construe narrowly all delegated
powers that curtail or dilute them." ' However, despite the im-
portant liberty at stake the President is probably correct in assuming
that all that is necessary to win the Court's acquiescence in passport
restrictions is for Congress to make them more specific in a new
statute. 42 This is not to imply that Congress should not in any
manner or under any circumstances impose restrictions on the free-
dom of travel, but rather that it should do so only to protect national
security and that procedures for enforcing the restrictions set forth
in the legislation should provide individuals with the widest possible
degree of protection against governmental arbitrariness.1 3
134. Id. at 192. See also BROWN, op. cit. supra note 126, at 333-35.
135. See Chase, Federal Loyalty Security Program, A Comment, 10 VAND. L.
REV. 553 (1957).
136. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Dayton v. Dulles, 857 U.S. 144 (1958).
137. See ABA, SPECIAL COMNrrrEE ON Coma uNisr TACTICS, STRATEGY, AND
OBJEcTnES, op. cit. supra note 108.
138. N.Y. Times, July 9, 1958, p. 10, col. 2.
139. 11 Stat. 60 (1956), 22 U.S.C. § 211a (1958).
140. 357 U.S. at 130.
141. Id. at 129.
142. N.Y. Times, July 8, 1958, p. 1, col. 4. See also id. at 54 for text of the
President's message.
143. For an exceptionally fine collection of views on the passport problem, see
STAFF OF SENATE ComnrnTTEE ON THE JJDiCaARY, 85TH CONG., 2D SEss., THE RIGHT
TO TRAvEL (1958).
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D. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board144
In Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, the
majority of the Court refused to pass on the constitutionality of the
provisions of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 145 re-
quiring "Communist-action" organizations to register as such. As
Judge Bazelon had pointed out in his dissent in the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia, there was a constitutional question in-
volved in that the requirement of registration appears on its face
to violate the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 46
However, the majority did not reach the constitutional question but
remanded the case to the Board "to make certain that the Board
bases its findings upon untainted evidence." M The Board had re-
fused to reopen the hearing to receive evidence that three witnesses
who had appeared against the Party in the original hearing had com-
mitted perjury. The Board felt that it had ample evidence to support
its findings apart from the testimony of the three whose honesty was
questioned. It was refreshing to have the Court lecture on the need
for an "untainted administration of justice," for it is hard to believe
that lawyers in the Department of Justice who had to work at length
with Harvey Matusow, one of the questionable witnesses, did not
recognize him for the liar he evidently was. But the Court's decision
hardly reflects a disregard for the power of Congress. To the con-
trary, there is strong reason for believing that, if the Court does
pass on the constitutionality of the act itself, it will find it constitu-
tional. Surely Mr. Justice Clark had made the same point in con-
ference with the eight other Justices that he made in his dissent:
Ironically enough, we are returning the case to a Board whose very exist-
ence is challenged on constitutional grounds. We are asking the Board to
pass on the credibility of witnesses after we have refused to say whether
it has the power to do so. The constitutional questions are fairly presented
here for our decision. If all or any part of the Act is unconstitutional, it
should be declared so on the record before us.
148
Granted, there is precedent for the Court to require exhaustion of
administrative remedies even in the face of a challenge of the con-
stitutionality of legislation setting up the administrative agency in-
volved, just as there is precedent to the contrary. 49 But this Court
has recently expressed the view that:
If . .. an administrative proceeding might leave no remnant of the con-
144. 351 U.S. 115 (1956).
145. 64 Stat. 987, 50 U.S.C.A. § 786 (1952).
146. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 223 F.2d 531, 576(D.C. Cir. 1955).
147. 351 U.S. at 125.
148. Id. at 130.
149. See DAvis, Anm InsRA-VE LAW Tnxr 362-65 (1959).
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stitutional question, the administrative remedy plainly should be pursued.
But where the only question is whether it is constitutional to fasten the
administrative procedure onto the litigant, the administrative agency may
be defied and judicial relief sought as the only effective way of protecting
the asserted constitutional right.150
If the court in the Communist Party case felt that it was possible for
the Board to act and to "leave no remnant of the constitutional
question," there is a strong inference that the constitutionality of
the Board itself was not questioned by the Court. Further, at least
two members of the majority subscribe to the general idea implicit
in Mr. Justice Clark's dissent that the Court should not wittingly do
today what it must necessarily undo tomorrow.151
IV. CASES IN WHICH TBE COURT ALLEGEDLY HAS THwARED
CONGRESSIONAL INTENT BY MIscoNsTuNG STATUTES
Obviously, a Supreme Court bent on doing so could for a time
defeat the will of Congress by deliberately misinterpreting mani-
fested congressional intent underlying legislation. Some commenta-
tors feel that the Warren Court has often done exactly this.'52 Is such
a charge warranted? Unfortunately, it is not always easy to divine
the intent of Congress even in relation to relatively uncomplicated
legislation. For example, what could seem more clear than the word
"Statement" in the statute enacted by Congress as a response to the
Court's decision in United States v. Jencks?'5M The statute provides
that:
In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States, no statement
or report in the possession of the United States which was made by a
Government witness or prospective Government witness (other than the
defendant) to an agent of the Government shall be the subject of subpena,
discovery, or inspection until said witness has testified on direct examina-
tion in the trial of the case.154
Yet, when the Court was confronted in Palermo v. United States 55
with the question whether or not a government agent's 600-word,
typed summary of a conference with a witness which included "brief
150. Public Utilities Comim'n v. United States, 355 U.S. 534, 539-40 (1958).
151. We may assume that where only one judicial remedy is provided, it
normally would be deemed exclusive. But the fact that habeas corpus after con-
viction is available in these cases gives added support to our reading of [the
statutory provision]. It supports a rejection of a construction of the Act that
requires the courts to march up the hill when it is apparent from the beginning
that they will have to march down again.
Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 125 (1946). (Emphasis added.)
152. See, e.g., Cohn & Bolan, The Supreme Court and the A.B.A. Report and
Resolutions, 28 Fonmnna L. REv. 233, 264, 266 (1959).
153. 353 U.S. 557 (1957).
154. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1958).
155. 360 U.S. 348 (1959).
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statements of information" was a "statement" within the meaning of
the statute, the Court found the meaning of "statement" quite
bewildering.
In recent years Mr. Justice Frankfurter has been so intrigued with
the difficulty of statutory interpretation that he has vied with him-
self to find prose adequate to describe it."6 Despite this elucidation
by Frankfurter as to the inherent difficulty in statutory interpreta-
tion, the notion persists that the Court is deliberately taking liberties
in statutory construction." 7
Examination of the relevant cases decided by the Warren Court
reveals that on the whole the Court has hewed pretty closely to the
canons of construction developed by earlier Supreme Courts with
the acquiescence of Congress. For example, the Warren Court often
has construed criminal statutes strictly but not so strictly as to
defeat the obvious intent behind the legislation.158 It has attempted
"to save and not to destroy" ra a statute which it construed and to
give "coherence to what Congress has done." 60 And it has given a
liberal construction to welfare legislation. 161
Which cases, then, are relied on to show that the Court has
disregarded the manifested intent of Congress? Yates v. United
States 12 is one that is frequently cited. In that case the Court con-
156. Some problems, he said, "will lie in the penumbra of express statutory man-
dates." Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957). In
respect to the Taft-Hartley Act, he wrote: "The statutory implications concerning
what has been taken from the States and what has been left to them are of a Delphic
nature, to be translated into concreteness by the process of litigating elucidation."
International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 619 (1958). Again, as if
to warn the political scientists and sociologists against attempting analyses of the
Court's performance, he said: "The judicial function is confined to applying what
Congress has enacted after ascertaining what it is that Congress has enacted. But
such ascertainment, that is, construing legislation, is nothing like a mechanical
endeavor. It could not be accomplished by the subtlest of modern 'brain' machines.
Because of the infirmities of language and the limited scope of science in legislative
drafting, inevitably there enters into the construction of statutes the play of judicial
judgment within the limits of the relevant legislative materials." Local 1976, AFL v.
NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 100 (1958). He even resorted to humor, at least once: "On
more than one occasion, but evidently not frequently enough, Judge Learned Hand
has warned against restricting the meaning of a statute to the meaning of its 'plain'
words, 'there is no surer way to misread any document than to read it literally.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter added: "'he notion that the plain meaning of the words
of a statute defines the meaning of the statute reminds one of T. H. Huxley's gay
observation that at times 'a theory survives long after its brains are knocked out."'
ibid.
157. See note 152 supra.
158. See Arroyo v. United States, 359 U.S. 419 (1959); Rainwater v. United
States, 356 U.S. 590 (1958); United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407 (1957); United
States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503 (1955).
159. United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538 (1955), quoting from NLBB
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937).
160. Achilli v. United States, 353 U.S. 373, 379 (1957).
161. United States v. Scovil, 348 U.S. 218 (1955).
162. 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
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strued the word "organize" to mean "acts entering into the creation
of a new organization." 1" Since the latest "organizing" of the Com-
munist Party of the United States within the meaning given by the
Court occurred in 1945, the pertinent statute of limitations pre-
cluded convicting anyone for "organizing" in recent years. 6 ' How-
ever, Congress failed to legislatively overrule the Court's interpreta-
tion of "organize" in Yates despite the contentions of Representative
Smith, author of the Smith Act, that Congress had intended "organ-
ize" to connote a continuing activity.1 5
Another area in which the Court has been criticized for miscon-
struing statutes is labor relations law. The chief justices of the states
reported that they found the Court's decision in Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills'66 "somewhat disturbing." They remarked:
That case concerns the interpretation of Section 301 of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act of 1947. Paragraph (a) of that Section provides:
"Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organiza-
tion representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined
in this Chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought
in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties.
. Section 01 (a) was held to be more than jurisdictional and was
held to authorize federal courts to fashion a body of federal law forthe enforcement of these collective bargaining agreements and to includewithin that body of federal law specific performance of promises to ari-trate grievances under collective bargaining agreements.' 6 7
Professor Meltzer, who was one of the team of University of Chicago
Law School professors who prepared studies for the Committee of
Supreme Court Judges, studies which, ironically, do not bear out the
contentions of the committee, did a comprehensive analysis of the
labor relations cases and made the point that "Although . . . [Sec-
tion 301 (a) appears] to be only a grant of jurisdiction, it should benoted that the standards for vicarious responsibility embodied in
Section 301 (b) constituted substantive regulation... ,, In
short, one cannot categorically claim that the Court was wrong
in its interpretation. Meltzer's discerning conclusions respecting the
Court, Congress and state jurisdiction over labor relations are rele-
vant here:
In a period bristling ith primitive denunciation of the Supreme Court
163. Id. at 310.
164. Id. at 312.165. See Celler, The Supreme Court Survives a Barrage, Reporter, Nov. 27, 1958,
p. 31.166. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).167. CoNFEEcNC e OF C a llF J cs imCEs CourtTTEE ON FErongL-STAm RETON-
inis inS A aFF timon MeDICiAL DECISIONS, cRPOoT 10 (1958).
168. Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress and State Jurisdiction Over Labor
Relations, 8 U. Cm. L. REc. 95, 115 (1958).
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it is appropriate to say again that these problems have not been created
by the Court. They result in part from the complexities of a federal system,
which are magnified in a "field" such as labor relations, which intersects
with so many activities and implicates such diverse forms of regulation.
They result also from the default of Congress with respect to fundamental
issues whose solution determines how and by whom a modem economy
should be governed and, indeed, in some situations whether it is to be
governed by all.169
It is to be regretted that the state supreme court justices had so little
time to consider the studies executed in their behalf by members of
the University of Chicago Law Faculty before they issued their own
report.7 0
The Court has also been criticized for its interpretation of various
statutory provisions pertaining to Communist aliens. Bonetti v.
Attorney Gen. 7' and United States v. Witkovich' 2 are cited as
prime examples, although Rowoldt v. Perfetto 173 could have been
included too. 74 In Bonetti the provision interpreted was the one
requiring the Attorney General to deport all aliens who were Com-
munists Party members "at the time of entering the United States,
or . ..at any time thereafter. . . ." 17' Bonetti had complicated
the issue by coming to the United States first in 1928, becoming a
Communist Party member between 1932-1986, leaving the country
and then returning in 1988. The majority decided that his "entry"
date was 1988 and not 1928.176 Consequently, he was not a Commu-
nist Party member during or after "entering the United States." Was
this unreasonable statutory interpretation?
The Witkovich case involved a provision of the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952 which required that any "alien against
whom a final order of deportation ...has been outstanding for
more than six months, shall . ..give information under oath as to
his nationality, circumstances, habits, associations, and activities,
169. Id. at 124-25.
170. Evidently, the Chicago professors were afflicted with the malady so common
in the profession - failure to meet deadlines. Unfortunately, this prevented the
chief justices from making full use of the excellent studies. For a blow-by-blow
account of the efforts of the justices to get the study materials, see CoN-rEnENcE OF
CaIEF JusncEs, CoMn-rEE ON FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONsHIPs AS AFFECTED BY
JUDICIAL DEcISIoNs, REPORT Forward (1958).
171. 856 U.S. 691 (1958).
172. 858 U.S. 194 (1957).
173. 355 U.S. 115 (1957).
174. ABA, SPECIAL Commirr=r ON ComumsT TACTICS, STRATEGY, AND OBJEC-
TlvEs, SuPPLE ENTAL REPORT, published in 104 CONG. REc. 19132-33 (1958);
Cohn & Bolan, The Supreme Court and the A.B.A. Report and Resolutions, 28 Fona-
mm L. REv. 233, 266, 267 (1959).
175. 356 U.S. 691, 694 (1958), quoting from the Anarchist Act § 4(a), 40 Stat.
1012 (1918), as amended by the Internal Security Act § 22, 64 Stat. 1006 (1950),
8 U.S.C. § 137(2) (1952).
176. See 356 U.S. 691 (1958).
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and such other information, whether or not related to the foregoing,
as the Attorney General may deem fit and proper .. ," 177 Despite
this broad grant of power to the Attorney General, the Court upheld
Witkovich's contention that the Attorney General could only ask
him those questions which would enable the government to ascer-
tain that he, Witkovich, was holding himself ready for deporta-
tion, and could not ask him questions about his associations and
activities.
The Internal Security Act of 1950 contained a provision making
aliens who were Communist Party members deportable.179 Later,
Congress realized that this provision as it stood was too broad, for
some people in other countries had joined the party innocently. 80
Consequently, in 1951, Congress amended the provision by defining
"membership" to mean "only membership or alffliation which is or
was voluntary, and shall not include membership or affiliation which
is or was solely (a) when under sixteen years of age, (b) by opera-
tion of law, or (c) for purposes of obtaining employment, food ra-
tions, or other essentials of living, and where necessary for such
purposes." '81 In the Rowoldt case, a majority of the Court found
that Rowoldt had been only a lukewarm Communist for approxi-
mately one year and felt that he was precluded from deportation
under the revised definition of "membership," if not specifically, at
least by the spirit of it. 8 2
just recently, the Court quoted with approval the words of an
earlier Court to the effect that "'[Wjhen the questions are of statu-
tory construction, not of constitutional import, Congress can rectify
our mistake, if such it was, or change its policy at any time, and in
these circumstances reversal is not readily to be made."" 18 3 The fact
that Congress has refrained from "rectifying" any of these alleged
"mistakes' is of some significance. Since there are those who refuse
to see much significance in Congress' refusal to act in such in-
stances, 84 the question will be developed more fully later.'85
177. United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194, 195 (1957), quoting from the
Criminal Appeals Act § 17, 68 Stat. 1232 (1954), 8 U.S.C. § 1252d (1952).
178. 353 U.S. at 184.
179. 64 Stat. 987, 1006 (1950).
180. Calvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 527 (1954).
181. 65 Stat. 28 (1951).
182. See Rowoldt v. Perfetto, 355 U.S. 115, 120-21 (1957).
183. Patterson v. United States, 359 U.S. 495, 496 (1959), quoting from United
States v. South Buffalo R.R., 333 U.S. 771, 774-75 (1948).
184. For example, Anthony Lewis, the New York Times' fine reporter, took this
view in critiquing this paper at the American Political Science Convention in 1959.
See also Note, Congressional Reversal of the Supreme Court Decisions: 1945--1957,
71 HAnV. L. BEy. 1324 (1958).
185. See notes 226-37 infra and accompanying text.
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V. CASES Iai WmcH TH CouRT HAs Ca~m&y AFFmMED BROAD
CONSTTUTONAL POWER FOR CONGRESS
It is significant that the decisions for which the Warren Court has
been criticized, even assuming the criticisms were valid, all deal
with but a few important issues. In making a complete assessment
of the Court's deference or lack of deference to Congress, it is ob-
viously a mistake to limit the inquiry to cases dealing with civil
liberties, Communists, or any other small segment of cases, however
important they may be. It is only within the context of all the War-
ren Court cases relating to congressional power that we can make
valid judgments.
The Court has been condemned by many, notably the chief jus-
tices of the states, for what they construe as acquiescence by the
Court in the aggrandizement of national power at the expense of
the states. Although analysis of Warren Court decisions dealing with
state power is beyond the scope of this Article, it is important to
this discussion of the Court and Congress to point out that in the
much-criticized decisions in the labor-relations field, the Court has
affirmed broad congressional power under the commerce clause.
And here the Court has developed no novel theories, as even the
Conference of Chief Justices' Committee on Federal-State Relation-
ships conceded, though it took a few gratuitous swipes at the Court:
in the days of Chief Justice Marshall the supremacy clause of the federal
Constitution and a broad construction of the powers granted to the na-
tional government were fully developed, and as a part of this development
the extent of national control over interstate commerce became very firmly
established. The trends established in those days have never ceased to
operate and in comparatively recent years have operated at times in a
startling manner in the extent to which interstate commerce has been held
to be involved, as for example in the familiar case involving an elevator
operator in a loft building.'8 6
At no time did the Warren Court suggest that Congress could not
cede power to the states in these fields -it even indicated to the
contrary.18 7 And Congress has finally acted to eliminate the "no-
man's land" of labor law.'
Dean Lockhart has summed up the matter succinctly:
The Chief Justices [of the states] deplore the rapid expansion of na-
tional powers, but they are criticizing the wrong agency or seeking the
wrong remedy. Congress is the agency that has expanded the national
186. CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES ComvNuTTEE ON FEDERAL-STATE RELATION-
SHIPS AS AFFECTED BY JUDicIAL DEcISIONS, REPORT 8 (1958).
187. See Cuss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1, 11 (1957).
188. See Cox, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the National Labor Relations
Act, 44 MINN. L. REv. 257, 261-62 (1959); McCoid, Notes on a "G-String": A Study
of the "No-Mars Land" of Labor Law, 44 MimN. L. REv. 205, 230-37 (1959).
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powers, and the Court has practiced judicial restraint in leaving these
policy determinations to Congress. If the Chief Justices want the Court
to check this legislative expansion of federal powers, the court must exer-
cise less judicial restraint, not more. 8 9
It is obvious that although the Court might be legitimately chas-
tised in this area on other grounds, criticism of the Court for its lack
of deference to Congress is completely unjustifiable.
The Warren Court has affirmed congressional power in several
other cases. For example, the Court found in Pennsylvania v. Nelson
that Congress could and did preempt the field of anti-sedition legis-
lation. 9 ' And, assuming that Congress intended, in setting up the
War Claims Commission, to create a body whose quasi-judicial de-
cisions would be free from political influence, the Court upheld that
intent against the President's assertion of power to remove a corn-
missioner. 19' Despite sharp dissents by Justices Black and Douglas,
the Court upheld Congress' power to dispose of tide-lands as it saw
fit, quoting with approval an earlier Court decision holding that the
power of Congress to dispose of any kind of property of the United
States "is vested in Congress without limitation." 92 The Court re-
affirmed Congress' power to regulate Indian affairs.' 93 It also upheld
what Corwin is wont to call Congress' "superpower," the power to
do virtually whatever it wishes in order to improve or protect navi-
gation on navigable or not-so-navigable waters. 94 And a unanimous
Court agreed that the power of Congress to legislate for the District
of Columbia "includes all the legislative powers which a state may
exercise over its affairs." 195
The Warren Court has also upheld congressional power in cases,
at least some of which bear out the contention that the Warren
Court has not been as protective of libertarian values as the "guard-
ian" of the Constitution should be. This is not to imply that in these
cases the Warren Court has acted differently from some of its prede-
cessors, or that the Warren Court was necessarily wrong.
A majority of the Court found the first amendment per se no bar
to a federal obscenity statute.'96 To raise this point here is not to
suggest that Congress should not be able to pass such a law but
rather that such a law should have to be evaluated in the context
189. Lockhart, Comment: A Response to the Conference of State Chief Justices,
107 U. PA. L. REv. 802, 803 (1959).
190. 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
191. Wiener v. United States, 857 U.S. 349 (1958).
192. Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272, 273 (1954), quoting from United States v.
Gratiot, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 526, 537 (1840).
193. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
194. See United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956).
195. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31 (1954).
196. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
1960] 627
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
of the first amendment. The point has been made well elsewhere:
Apart from strong reasons for constitutional protection arising out of the
importance of freedom of expression in this area, recognition of a constitu-
tional issue in obscenity censorship would have substantial additional
advantages in providing a more dependable and sane method of discrim-
inating between that which may be banned as obscene and that which
must be permitted to circulate.' 97
While denying that it was dealing with the constitutional ques-
tions, the Court indicated that Congress could probably consti-
tutionally prohibit corporations and labor unions from buying
television time to promote candidates.198 But, as the dissenters, Jus-
tices Douglas and Black and the Chief Justice, pointed out, the
first amendment would seem to preclude such legislation.199 Nor did
a majority seem to worry about the impact of the first amendment
on a sweeping law requiring registration of lobbyists.
200
Despite Mr. Justice Black's biting dissent,20' in which he stated
that punishment for criminal contempt by means of summary
proceeding "has aptly been characterized by a State Supreme Court
as, 'perhaps, nearest akin to despotic power of any power existing
under our form of government,"' 20 2 the majority (just as the Su-
preme Court had always done) 20 3 upheld an old act of Congress
which they contended provided for summary punishment for con-
tempts under some circumstances.
Nor did a majority see that the Immunity Act of 1954 tread hard
on the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment, although
Mr. Justice Pouglas, with Mr. Justice Black concurring, argued per-
suasively that it did.204 Neither could a majority see how the Gam-
blers Occupational Tax Act violated the self-incrimination clause,
even though it requires gamblers to indicate that they are violating
the law.205
On the grounds that "the power of Congress over the admission
of aliens and their right to remain is necessarily very broad, touching
as it does basic aspects of national sovereignty, more particularly our
197. See Lockhart & McClure, Literature, the Law of Obscenity and the Con-
stitution, 38 MuNN. L. REv. 295, 388 (1954). See the dissents in Roth, 354 U.S. at
503 (Harlan, J.), at 508 (Douglas, J.).
198. See United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567 (1957).
199. Id. at 597.
200. See United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
201. 356 U.S. 165, 193 (1958). The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Douglas
joined in dissent.
202. Greene v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 194 (1958), quoting from State ex rel.
Ashbaugh v. Circuit Court, 97 Wis. 1, 8, 72 N.W. 193, 194-95 (1897).
203. See id. at 189 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
204. See Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 440 (1956).
205. See Lewis v. United States, 348 U.S. 419 (1955).
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foreign relations and the national security,"2°6 a majority, in Galvan
v. Press expressing regrets as they did so, permitted some almost un-
believable deprivations of the liberties of aliens. It found Galvan, an
alien who had been a Communist from 1944 to 1946, deportable on
the basis of a statute passed in 1950 which required deportation of
any alien who at the time of entry to the United States, or any time
thereafter, was a member of the Communist Party.0 7 Incredibly, the
majority found that this was not ex post facto even though conced-
ing that "the intrinsic consequences of deportation are so close to
punishment for crime, it might fairly be said also that the ex post
facto Clause, even though applicable only to punitive legislation,
should be applied to deportation."208 In another case where an alien
was denied an application for suspension of a deportation order on
the basis of confidential and undisclosed information, the majority
opined that on the basis of Galvan, "we must adopt the plain mean-
ing of a statute, however severe the consequences." 20 9 They added
that "suspension of deportation is not given to deportable aliens as
a right, but, by congressional direction, it is dispensed according to
the unfettered discretion of the Attorney General." 10 It is inter-
esting to note that the Court took a different view of such unfettered
discretion in the Greene case discussed earlier. In fairness, it must be
added that in some cases, by statutory interpretation, the Court has
mitigated the hard lot of aliens, omy to be criticized in some
quarters for doing so.211
VI. TE WARREN COURT AS A PoucY-MAKEn
As a reaction to the earlier days when it was being asserted both
by the Court and commentators that the Court merely decided
cases, it has become popular to play up the fact that the Court does
make policy. For example, a majority of the Warren Court speaking
through Justice Frankfurter blandly conceded, as perhaps no other
Supreme Court before it would have, that courts make law.212 A
former federal judge, Robert A. Leflar, now Professor of Law at the
University of Arkansas, said recently, "One thing stands out above
all else from this - our courts have made most of our law, the
206. Calvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954).
207. See id. at 526.
208. Id. at 531.
209. Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 357 (1956).
210. Id. at 357-58.
211. See notes 171-82 supra and accompanying text.
212. "The claims of dominant opinion rooted in sentiments of justice and public
morality are among the most powerful shaping-forces in lawmaldng by courts. Legis-
lation and adjudication are interacting influences in the development of law." Nation-
al City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 360 (1955).
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mass of our common law. Courts do make law. It is their business
to make law. At least that is true of appellate courts." 113 Indeed, it
is true that the Supreme Court makes law and with it national public
policy. But some of the claims and allegations about the extent and
manner of law and policy-making by the Court are extravagant be-
yond reason. Take, for example, these words of Professor Bernard
Schwartz:
A high court which, in effect, reverts to the position of originating
lawmaker is bound to encounter popular opposition. This is especially true
when the tribunal is composed of men who give all too frequent evidence
of being unversed in the intricacies of our public law and procedure. Such
men will inevitably be deficient even in adequately explaining the bases
of their actions. Their opinions will tend to be homilies in political science.
Their language will be turgid and verbose; their reasoning prolix and
obscure. All too often, they will ignore the distinction between obiter and
ratio and the appropriate weight to be given to different types of legal
and non-legal authority.214
The implication of such criticism is that the Court has set itself
up as a super-legislature, deciding on its own initiative what the
laws and policies of the nation should be. But the fact remains the
Court exercises no such wide-ranging power. Whatever it does in
respect to law and policy-making, it does in consequence of deciding
specific cases. As Dean Rostow put it: "The Court's function is rec-
ognizably different from that of the legislature or of the executive,
even when it must weigh the same considerations in the scales. The
forum is different. The time is different, so that the pressure of con-
tending interests appears in a different perspective."21 5 Of course,
the Supreme Court makes law and policy, but it does so not as a
legislature but as a Court, by interpreting the Constitution and stat-
utes and by filling in the interstices of the law. And this the Warren
Court has done, no more, no less, than its predecessors. Decisions
which are relied upon to demonstrate that the Warren Court has a
special proclivity for law-making are for the most part decisions
which involved the meaning of the Constitution. If the Court has
the function, which we as a people seem to agree that it has, of
upholding the Constitution, then it should hear and decide import-
ant cases involving constitutional questions. Whichever way it de-
cides an important case, it makes policy in the sense that it affects
public policy.
It has been alleged that the Court usurped legislative powers in
218. Leflar, The Task of the Appellate Court, 33 NoaE DAME LAw. 548, 562
(1958).
214. Schwartz, The Supreme Court-October 1957 Term, 57 MicH. L. REv.
315, 848 (1959).
215. Rostow, The Supreme Court and the People's Will, 33 NoTam DAME LAw.
573, 585 (1958).
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the school segregation cases. 16 But if the Constitution has meaning,
how else could the Court have decided Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion? 217 To argue that schools can be separate and equal in this day
and age makes about as much sense as arguing that Apartheid is not
designed to discriminate against the Negro.21 It might be worth
pausing to consider that it was an earlier Court overruling what
seemed to be the express intent of Congress which originally estab-
lished the legal basis for racial discrimination. 19 Subsequent deci-
sions as to enforcement of the Brown decision are a natural conse-
quence of that decision. There is no indication in the Court's opin-
ions in these cases that it would be aggrieved by legislative and
executive action on both national and state levels to establish policy
in this area that met with constitutional requirements.
The state chief justices indicated that they felt that the Supreme
Court "too often has tended to adopt the role of policy-maker with-
out proper judicial restraint" in "supervision of state action . . .by
virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment."220 But, as can be seen, these
justices themselves point out why the Court was compelled to do
so -the fourteenth amendment.
There is still another category of cases where it has been alleged
that the Court has gone too far in making policy-those cases in-
volving the jurisdiction of state and national governments over labor
relations.22' It is true that the Court had attempted to fill in the
interstices of the law, but they did so because they believed that
Congress had "delegated" the task to them. As the Court explained,
speaking through Mr. Justice Frankfurter:
The comprehensive regulation of industrial relations by Congress, novel
federal legislation twenty-five years ago but now an integral part of our
216. HAND, Trm BrLL or RiG-s 55 (1958).
217. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
218. But see Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HAnv. L. REv. 1, 33 (1959).
In the context of a charge that segregation with.equal facilities is a denial of
equality, is there not a point in Plessy in the statement that if "enforced separa-
tion stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority" it is solely because its
members choose to put that construction upon it?
Ibid. With due respect to Professor Wechsler, is there any doubt that segregation in
the schools stems from the feeling among southern whites that the Negro is inferior
and that segregation thus confirms and stamps the Negro with "a badge of inferior-
ity"? See Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421
(1960); Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor
Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. RBv. 1, 24-31 (1959).
219. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
220. CoNFREacmE OF CamF Jusc s Comm=n'rFE ON FEDERAL-STATE RELATioN-
SHIPS AS AFFEcTED BY JUDIC.AL DEcsoNs, REPORT 27 (1958).
221. See id. at 9-11. But the committee concedes that the "uncertainty is in part
undoubtedly due to the failure of Congress to make its wishes entirely clear." Id.
at 10.
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economic life, inevitably gave rise to difficult problems of federal-state
relations. To be sure, in the abstract these problems came to us as ordinary
questions of statutory construction. But they involved a more complicated
and perceptive process than is conveyed by the delusive phrase, "ascertain-
ing the intent of the legislature." Many of these problems probably could
not have been, at all events were not, foreseen by Congress. Others were
only dimly perceived and their precise scope only vaguely defined. This
Court was called upon to apply a new and complicated legislative scheme,
the aims and social policy of which were drawn with broad strokes while
the details had to be filled in, to no small extent by the judicial process.222
For years, Congress did nothing to relieve the Court of the respon-
sibility it has assumed for making policy in this area.
There can be no question that Congress has discovered the politi-
cal efficacy of allowing the Court to spell out policy in controversial
fields and that the Court has sometimes performed the task perhaps
neither happily nor well. In any case, the Court has not usurped the
function of policy-making from Congress.
The Supreme Court has traditionally exercised wide policy-
making powers in respect to supervising administration of criminal
justice in the federal courts.223 The Warren Court, in a 5-4 decision,
has asserted recently that the Court also has "supervisory powers
over federal law enforcement agencies." 224 As the dissenters pointed
out,225 this is the first time that such power per se has been claimed
by the Court. Nonetheless, the Warren Court has made it clear that
even in these areas it will adhere to the expressed wishes of Con-
gress, unless, of course, those wishes run counter to provisions of the
Constitution.
VII. Tim MEANINc OF WHAT CoNGREss HAs DONE AND HAs NOT
DONE REGABDiNG =r CoURT
If, as alleged, the Court has been trespassing upon the domain of
Congress, surely Congress should be very much aggrieved. Yet
Congress has chosen to do virtually nothing about the alleged tres-
222. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 859 U.S. 286, 239, 240 (1959).
(Emphasis added.) See Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress and State Jurisdiction
Over Labor Relations, 8 U. Cm. L. Ruc. 95, 96 (1958).
In any event, Congressional directions were, as the Court has frequently ob-
served, fragmentary and elusive. As a result, there was committed to the Court
the task of adjusting two intricate systems of regulation. The Court, in turn
purported to determine what Congress "intended," or what it would have
"intended" if it had appreciated the problems involved, or perhaps what kind of
adjustments between federal and state power made sense within the framework
of the national regulation.
Ibid.
223. See, e.g., Palermo v. United States, 860 U.S. 848 (1959); Mallory v. United
States, 854 U.S. 449 (1957).
224. Rea v. United States, 850 U.S. 214, 217 (1956).
225. Id. at 218 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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passes. How much significance can be attached to Congress' failure
to act? There are those who argue "not much." For example, the
authors of an analysis of congressional reversals of Supreme Court
decisions from 1945-1957 22 concluded:
Judicial reluctance to overrule past decisions or to correct an imperfec-
tion in the drafting of a statute is often based on the easy assumption
that the legislature will act to change an unsatisfactory result. Some
authorities in the field even go so far as to place the duty to correct errors
in statutory interpretation exclusively with the legislature. But a recogni-
tion of the unusual unanimity of interest and opinion which is gener-
ally required to bring about a congressional reversal of a Supreme
Court decision indicates that reliance on legislative correction is rarely
warranted. 227
It is certainly true that obtaining the consensus necessary in Con-
gress to override a Court decision is a difficult matter. It is also true
that "the Court's decisions often carry more weight than logic in-
tends them to, and that it will be suggested (as in the Tidelands and
Phillips Petroleum cases) that an adverse congressional action some-
how would violate the principle of the separation of powers."22s
Nonetheless, when Congress is deeply disturbed about a Supreme
Court decision, and it has the constitutional power to override that
particular decision, it can do so. The authors of the foregoing study
have themselves provided a catalogue of such cases.229 And Mr. Jus-
tice Douglas' words spoken at the Columbia Law School are perti-
nent here: "If the Congressional will is defied, the error can be
corrected by an amendment of the law." He pointed out that there
were at least twenty-six instances between 1945 and 1957 in income
tax cases "where Congress by later enactment modified or changed
the rule of law announced by the Supreme Court. 230 Regardless of
what significance can be attached to congressional failure to act, it
seems clear that were the Court truly rnning roughshod over Con-
gress, a consensus would have been reached in Congress to curb the
Court.
Congress has sometimes taken quick action to overturn a Supreme
Court decision. Immediately after the decision in Jencks v. United
States2 -31 perhaps moved by Mr. Justice Clark's bitter dissent charg-
ing that "Unless Congress changes the rule announced by the Court
today, those intelligence agencies of our Government engaged in
226. See Note, Congressional Reversal of Supreme Court Decisions: 1945-1957,
71 HAzv. L. REv. 1324 (1958).
227. Id. at 1337.
228. Memorandum from Professor John J. Cound to the author, Oct. 1, 1959.
229. See note 226 supra.
230. N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1958, § 1, p. 1, col 3, at p. 44, col. 1.
231. 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
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law enforcement may as well close up shop, for the Court has
opened their files to the criminal and thus afforded him a Roman
holiday for rummaging through confidential information as well as
vital national secrets," 232 and by the ensuing publicity given the
former Attorney General's words, the Congress did study the Jencks
decision and enact a statute. However, the result was virtual reaffir-
mation of the Court decision.2 3
3
As pointed out earlier, in 1959 Congress did enact new labor legis-
lation which in part reversed Supreme Court decisions, although it
could be equally argued that Congress was really reversing its own
position.23 4 This, then, is what Congress has done about Court
decisions, but weigh against this what Congress has refused to do.
Congress has over the past few years considered a whole host of
proposals aimed at the Court. A year ago, Senator Jenner implored
Congress "to protect itself and the country against the usurpations
of this runaway, wild Court, which is tearing down the Constitution
of the United States. 23 5 Yet Congress has chosen to do nothing
about these proposals. True, some measures did pass the House but
these were not measures which would have changed the composition
of the Court or diminished its powers.236 They were measures which
would have reconstrued statutes which a majority of the House felt
the Court had misconstrued. But all of these failed either to pass
or be considered by the Senate.23r More important, on the highly-
charged issue of desegregation in the schools, Congress did nothing
to demonstrate discontent with what the Court had done.
CONCLUSIONS
Although a minority of the Justices -Black, Douglas, Brennan,
and the Chief Justice-would probably prefer to have it other-
wise, the Warren Court as an institution has been exceptional-
ly deferential to Congress. So much so, that for one with libertarian
values it has been too permissive, allowing Congress to make grave
invasions of fundamental liberties. Therefore, it is strange, indeed,
that the Court has been attacked for treading on the power of Con-
gress. However, several explanations for this criticism come to mind.
232. Id. at 681.
233. See 71 Stat. 595 (1957), 18 U.S.C. § 8500 (1958). But see Cohn & Bolan,
The Supreme Court and the A.B.A. Report and Resolutions, 28 FoRDHm- L. REv.
233, 257 (1958).
234. See notes 221-22 supra and acompanying text.
235. 104 CONG. REc. 18645 (1958); see Senator Jenner's remarks, id. at 8683,
13813, 14089.
236. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1958, p. 1, col. 5; Celler, The Supreme Court
Survives a Barrage, Reporter, Nov. 27, 1958, p. 31.
237. Ibid.
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First, a good part of the criticism stems from people who are un-
happy about particular decisions, such as the segregation decisions.
In their fury, they are willing to use any and all arguments avail-
able against the Court in the hope that somehow the decisions can
be reversed. In addition, there is some element of the strategy used
by umpire "baiters" in baseball. To paraphrase a one-time baseball
manager who was a notorious umpire baiter, "you don't change the
umpire's mind about the decision just made, but you can sure worry
him about the next one." The strategy makes sense, for the Court
is very sensitive to public opinion. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter put
it: "The claims of dominant opinion rooted in sentiments of justice
and public morality are among the most powerful shaping-forces in
law-making by courts." 238 There is ample evidence that the Court
will not long swim against the current of prevailing opinion.23 9 If
proponents of certain views can create the impression that they are
in fact the dominant opinion, they may well force the Court to
modify its views, however right the Court may have been.240
Second, any assessment of how the Warren Court has performed
depends in large part on from what point of view one reads the
Bill of Rights and other provisions of the Constitution safeguarding
individual liberty. If these provisions have real meaning, then, a
Court in our system must uphold them against encroachment even
by Congress. Sadly enough, over the past few years there has been
a general failure among Americans to appreciate the tremendous
importance of our fundamental liberties. As incredible as it seems,
men trained in the law, the Special Committee on Communism,
Tactics, Strategy and Objectives of the American Bar Association,
offered the following resolution for the approval of the Association's
House of Delegates:
Be it further resolved that whenever there are reasonable grounds to
believe that as a result of court decisions internal security is weakened, or
wherever technicalities are invoked against the protection of our nation,
remedial legislation be enacted by the Congress .... 241
238. National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 360 (1955).
239. See Mendelson, Mr. Justice Frankfurter-Law and Choice, 10 VAND. L.
REv. 333, 341 (1957).
240. This apparently is what motivated the Court's decision in Barenblatt v.
United States, discussed in notes 28-40 supra and accompanying text. For another
example of judicial response to dominant public opinion, note Mr. Justice Roberts'
explanation for the Court's shift in attitude after the 1936 election:
Looking back, it is difficult to see how the Court could have resisted the popular
urge for uniform standards throughout the country-for what in effect was a
unified economy...
ROBEmTS, TnE CouuT AND CoNSTTrTION 61-62 (1951). See MASON, SEcuBITY
THROUGH FBmEDom 109-11 (1957).
241. N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1959, p. 1, col. 2, at p. 25, col. 1. See Excerpts from
American Civil Liberties Union Analysis of Bar's Proposal on High Court Rulings,
N.Y. Times, April 19, 1959, § 1, p. 82.
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Technicalities indeed! It is the Bill of Rights they refer to. The
reference to "technicalities" was finally deleted, but only after spir-
ited debate. In the course of the debate, an eminent past president
of the Association, Loyd Wright, asserted that "American people
pay too much attention to their liberties and not enough to their
responsibilities."242
Third, some of the criticism of the Court comes from those who
feel that as a matter of democratic principle, the Court should very
reluctantly exercise the power to declare acts of Congress unconsti-
tutional. They generally do not advocate that the Court be deprived
of the power completely. They prefer that the Court exercise self-
restraint. Oddly enough, the majority of the Court itself is presently
committed to this view. But, evidently, they have not exercised
enough restraint to satisfy some critics.
In view of the Court's failure to check the excesses of Congress,
why has the Court escaped criticism from libertarian quarters? To
some extent the answer must lie in the fact that we have just weath-
ered a period in our history in which government has not been
scrupulous about observing the rights of citizens. Consequently, any
victory at all has loomed large in the thinking of libertarians. And
the defeats have been accepted philosophically as manifestations
of the times. Also, they have felt it so important to defend the Court
for the few important victories achieved, notably the segregation
decisions, that they have been chary about criticizing the Court lest
such criticism help dissipate the few victories.
Second, many who hold libertarian values also have a deep com-
mitment to the concept of majority rule. For them, there has been
real appeal in the arguments for judicial self-restraint. They have
failed to appreciate that judicial self-restraint does not have the
same impact that prohibiting the Court to exercise the power to
declare an act of Congress unconstitutional would have. For the
public at large, the failure of the Court to exercise its power, even
as a matter of principle, is regarded as approval of what Congress
has done and gives to the action an added and impressive endorse-
ment. Mr. Justice Jackson made the point well in his separate
opinion in Korematsu v. United States:
A military commander may overstep the bounds of constitutionality, and it
is an incident. But if we review and approve, that passing incident be-
comes the doctrine of the Constitution. There it has a generative power of
its own, and all that it creates will be in its own image.2 43
It is far better for the Court to be stripped of the power for all to
242. N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1959, § 1, p. 1, col. 2, at p. 25, col. 1.
243. 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944).
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know rather than to maintain an illusion, in a doctrine of self-re-
straint, that the Court can be counted upon in a real pinch to serve
as a bulwark against congressional invasions of liberty. In this con-
nection, Professor Harrop Freeman's observation of the record of
the Supreme Court is meaningful: "The Court must protect [first
amendment] liberties for once against the federal legislature. 175
years of nonuse of the power given the Court raises question
whether power exists."244 In short, if the citizenry are to be the
"safest depository of their own rights," it should be made clear to
them that they can only depend upon themselves.245
But the time has come for those with libertarian values to point
up the failure of the Court to defend constitutional liberties from
invasions by the Congress. Certainly, it would never do to allow
the Court to believe that the "dominant opinion" of the nation ap-
proves emasculation of constitutional liberties.
244. Freeman, Civil Liberties-Acid Test of Democracy, 43 MwN. L. REv. 511,
528 (1959). See Edgerton, Incidence of Judicial Control over Congress, 22 ComqEta
L.Q. 299 (1937); Sklar, The Fiction of the First Freedom, 6 WEST PoL. Q. 302(1953).
245. For an excellent treatment of the doctrine of judicial self-restraint, see
Mendelson, supra note 239.
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